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FORUM
BLOOMER GIRL REVISITED OR HOW TO FRAME
AN UNMADE PICTURE
VICTOR P. GOLDBERG'
Nearly all contracts casebooks feature the saga of Shirley MacLaine's
suit against Twentieth Century Fox arising from the cancellation of the
proposed film Bloomer Girl.' None really get the story right. To be
fair, none try. The case is a vehicle for exploring the obligation of the
victim of the breach of an employment contract to take alternative
employment. If MacLaine refused an offer of alternative employment that
was not "different and inferior," her failure to mitigate would mean that
the earnings she would have received would be offset against the
* Thomas Macioce Professor of Law and co-director of the Center for Law and
Economic Studies, Columbia University. B.A. Oberlin College, 1963; Ph.D. Yale
University, 1970. This Essay has benefited from the comments of workshop participants
at both Columbia and Michigan. In addition, the author would like to acknowledge the
helpful comments on earlier drafts by Barry Adler, Barbara Black, Marvin Chirelstein,
Allan Farnsworth, Ron Gilson, Alice Haemmerli, Ken Jones, Avery Katz, Ken Kleinberg,
Chuck Knapp, Saul Levmore, Carol Sanger, Bobby Schwartz, and Linda Silberman.
James Killmond provided research assistance.
1. See Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970).
It is the opening case in 1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION
51 (1995). Other casebooks that reprint it as a main case include STEVEN J. BURTON,
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 318 (1995); THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J.
WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 371 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN
P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 45 (7th ed. 1998); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 508 (5th
ed. 1995); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 266 (6th
ed. 1996); AMY HILSMAN KASTELY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAW 1016 (1996); JAMES F.
HOGG & CARTER G. BISHOP, CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 496
(1997); IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 132
(2d ed. 1978); ARTHUR ROSETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 375 (5th ed.
1994); ROBERT E. SCOTr & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 769
(1988); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED
OBLIGATION 262 (3d ed. 1997). The following casebooks include a brief excerpt from
the decision: ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 23
(2d ed. 1992); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 949 (3d ed. 1993); EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES
IN CONTRACT LAW 894 (5th ed. 1997). JOHN D. CALAMARI ET AL., CASES AND
PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 610 (2d ed. 1989) does not cite the case, but it uses a
simplified version of the facts as a problem. The case does not appear in FRIEDRICH
KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1986).
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damages; so, asked the court, was the alternative proposed by Fox
"different and inferior?" And for that purpose it can be great fun. Is a
western-type movie to be filmed in Australia different and inferior to a
musical about Amelia Bloomer to be filmed in Hollywood? If so, what
would not be? A musical filmed in England? A western musical? What
about a western set in Mexico in which MacLaine played a nun with an
unsavory past? Could she have possibly settled for that?
Well, actually, she did. Universal Pictures released Two Mules for
Sister Sara about one year before the California Supreme Court released
Parker v. Twentieth Century Fox, with Shirley MacLaine co-starring in
both.2 Would the court also have found that project different and inferior
as a matter of law? More importantly, should it matter? Suppose that the
alternative film proposed by Fox was also a musical to be filmed in
Hollywood, with the same director associated with the Bloomer Girl
project, and with all contract terms identical. If she had rejected that
alternative, would she still have been allowed to recover under the
original contract? Or suppose that this alternative project had been
proposed by a second studio. If she rejected that offer would she still be
able to recover from Fox? The hypothesized offer would not be
"different and inferior"; regardless of its source, her rejection should take
Fox off the hook. At least that appears to be the moral.
In fact, even if the second offer had been equivalent, she probably
would have prevailed, perhaps even on a summary judgment motion.
Moreover, she should prevail. By posing the problem in terms of the
"different or inferior" question, the California Supreme Court deflected
attention from the essence of the contract. The contract had a "pay-or-
play" provision, common in the motion picture industry. The studio had,
in effect, purchased an option on her time; they would pay her to be
ready to make a particular film, but they made, no promise to actually use
her in making the film. When Fox canceled the project, they did not
breach; they merely chose not to exercise their option. There was no
2. The film, co-starring Clint Eastwood, was released by Universal in 1969.
Herein, the plot summary:
Set in Mexico, a nun called Sara is rescued from three cowboys by Hogan,
who is on his way to do some reconnaissance, for a future mission to capture
a French fort. The French are chasing Sara, but not for the reasons she tells
Hogan, so he decides to help her in return for information about the fort
defences. Inevitably the two become good friends but Sara has a secret.
Rob Hartill, Internet Movie Database (visited Sept. 19, 1998) < http://us.imdb.com/Plot?
Two +Mules +for+ Sister +Sara+ (1969) >.
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breach and, therefore, there was no need to mitigate.3 And the supreme
court knew it. Nonetheless, they chose to ignore it (or nearly so).
By framing the case as it did, the Parker court managed to convert
an easy case into a harder one. That it gave the right answer is a
fortuitous result. The contract language was clear, the function of the
contract terms transparent. Had the court framed the issue properly,
focusing on the nature of the pay-or-play obligation, the case would have
been doctrinally less interesting, but of much greater interest to those
concerned with the design of transactions. Why use a pay-or-play clause?
If the studio does cancel a project that has been made pay-or-play, what
determines whether the studio should encourage the artist to work with
another studio during the pay-or-play period? Would the earnings from
the project with a second studio be offset against the first studio's
obligation? Could the first studio prevent the artist from working for the
second studio during the pay-or-play period?
This Essay proceeds as follows. The background of the dispute is
presented in Part I. Part II tracks the case through the courts, showing
how the mitigation component of the case waxed while the pay-or-play
component waned. Part III discusses the whys and wherefores of pay-or-
play clauses, paying particular attention to an issue not explicitly raised
by Parker, the relationship between the artist and other potential
employers.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BLOOMER GIRL PROJECT
Bloomer Girl was an adaptation of a stage musical, music by Harold
Arlen and lyrics by Yip Harburg, that had a two-year run on Broadway
in the mid-1940s.4 Harburg's son summarized the play's plot and
political themes:
Bloomer Girl concerns the political activities of Amelia
(renamed Dolly) Bloomer and the effect they have on the pre-
Civil War family of her brother-in-law, hoopskirt king Horace
Applegate, and his feminist daughter, Evelina. Evelina is the
youngest and only remaining unmarried Applegate daughter; her
older sisters are all married to company salesmen, and as
Bloomer Girl begins, Horace is trying to unify business and
3. The studio's option need not entirely lapse when it cancels the project. It
might, depending on the contract language, have the right to continued service by the
artist.
4. See HAROLD MEYERSON & ERNIE HARBURG, WHO PUT THE RAINBOW IN THE
Wm4RD OF OZ? Yip HARBURG, LYRICIST 183-219 (1993). The show ran for 654
performances on Broadway. See id. at 213.
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family by encouraging his chief Southern salesman, Jefferson
Calhoun, to court Evelina. On the eve of the Civil War,
Bloomer Girl centers around Evelina's tutelage of Jeff in matters
of gender and racial equality. Evelina, Dolly, and the other
feminists of Cicero Falls not only campaign against Applegate's
hoopskirts and sexism but also stage their own version of Uncle
Tom's Cabin and conceal a runaway slave-Jeff's own
manservant, Pompey. It was, said Yip, a show about "the
indivisibility of human freedom."
Bloomer Girl interweaves the issues of black and female
equality and war and peace with the vicissitudes of courtship
and pre-Civil War politics .... [I]t was at no point an escapist
entertainment. "There were so many new issues coming up
with Roosevelt in those years," Yip once said, "and we were
trying to deal with the inherent fear of change-to show that
whenever a new idea or a new change in society arises, there'll
always be a majority that will fight you, that will call you a
dirty radical or a red."5
When she entered into her contract to make Bloomer Girl in August
1965, Shirley MacLaine was one of the biggest female stars in
Hollywood, having received three Academy Award nominations for Best
Actress in a five-year span.6 The contract negotiation had taken about
seven months. Shooting was to begin the following May and was
expected to take fourteen weeks. She would receive ten percent of the
gross profits of the film to be offset against her guaranteed compensation
($750,000) and expenses of $50,000. 7 She had the right to approve the
5. Id. at 186-87. Professors Macaulay et al. speculate on whether the left-of-
center politics of the play might have influenced Shirley MacLaine's decision to choose
this project. See MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 63-65. Mary Jo Frug proposed a
political interpretation of the Parker decision, emphasizing the feminist politics of Amelia
Bloomer. See Mary Jo Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts
Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065, 1114-22 (1985). As we shall see below, the politics
of both Miss MacLaine and Bloomer Girl had nothing to do with the proper disposition
of the case.
6. The nominations were for IRMA LA DOUCE (United Artists 1963) in 1964,
THE APARTMENT (United Artists 1960) in 1961, and SOME CAME RUNNING (Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer 1959) in 1960. See Internet Movie Database (visited Sept. 18, 1998)
<http://us.imdb.com/Pawards?MacLaine, +Shirley >.
7. None of the court opinions specifically recognize that the initial contract gave
MacLaine ten percent of the gross, although a number of the briefs available to the courts
made note of this fact. See, e.g., Opening Brief of Appellant in the Court of Appeal at
4, Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 81 Cal. Rtpr. 221 (Ct. App. 1969) (Civ.
No. 33270) [hereinafter Appellant's Opening Brief]; Respondent's Brief in the Court of
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screenplay and the director. In fact, the director, George Cukor, had
already been approved. His previous film, My Fair Lady, had been both
an artistic and commercial success: both the film and Cukor won
Academy Awards in 1965.1 If the movie had been produced, and if it
had been as successful at the box office as My Fair Lady, MacLaine
would have earned over $3 million from the domestic box office alone. 9
Her contract included a standard "pay-or-play" provision: "We shall
not be obligated to utilize your services in or in connection with the
Photoplay hereunder, our sole obligation, subject to the terms and
conditions of this Agreement, being to pay you the guaranteed
compensation herein provided for." 0 That is, she would receive the
$750,000 guaranteed compensation as long as she was ready, willing, and
able to perform. If Fox decided to replace her or to abandon the project,
they remained obligated to pay her the $750,000.
While waiting for shooting to begin on Bloomer Girl, MacLaine
turned down a role in Casino Royale, for which she would have received
guaranteed compensation of $1,000,000 plus an unspecified percentage."
She did, however, manage to fit one film in; according to her agent she
"consented to perform in the motion picture called 'Gambit' for Universal
Pictures only because she knew at the time that the motion picture
'Bloomer Girl' would follow." 1 2
In March 1966, Fox decided to terminate the Bloomer Girl project
for reasons unspecified.'3 They proposed that MacLaine consider taking
Appeal at 86, Parker (Civ. No. 33270) [hereinafter Respondent's Briefl. For a
description and analysis of contingent compensation in the movie business, see Victor P.
Goldberg, The Net Profits Puzzle, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 524 (1997).
8. See Internet Movie Database (visited Sept. 19, 1998) <http://us.imdb.com/
Tawards?My + Fair + Lady + (1964) >.
9. The domestic rentals for My Fair Lady were about $34 million. See Internet
Movie Database (visited Sept. 19, 1998) <http://us.imdb.com/Business?My+Fair+
Lady +(1964)>. Rentals are the studio's share of the box office that typically come to
about half the domestic box office. See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 543.
10. Respondent's Answer to Petition for Hearing in the Supreme Court of
California at 6, Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970)
(L.A. No. 29705) [hereinafter Respondent's Answer].
11. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 7, at 18. It is not clear whether she was
to receive a percentage of the gross receipts, as in Bloomer Girl, or of some other
amount. The large number of stars associated with Casino Royale (and her counsel's
silence) suggests that the contingent compensation was less favorable for Casino Royale.
12. Id. at 82. GAMBIT (1966), co-starring Michael Caine, was a crime-caper
movie. See Internet Movie Database (visited Sept. 19, 1998)
<http://us.imdb.com/Title?Gambit+ (1966)>.
13. Fox's letter to MacLaine said, in part:
Because of circumstances which have arisen since the date of the
Agreement, we have determined not to proceed with the production of the
1998:1051 1055
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instead the female lead in a western-type drama, Big Country, Big Man
(BCBM), set, and to be filmed in, Australia. She had read the screenplay
in June 1965 and had expressed interest in doing the film if there were a
different director. 4 In the March discussions, her agent informed Fox
that MacLaine was no longer interested in the alternative project. A few
weeks later, Fox sent a letter (characterized by her counsel as artfully
drafted) 5 to MacLaine informing her that her services would not be
utilized in Bloomer Girl and offering her the female lead in BCBM as a
substitute, giving her one week to accept the offer. 6 The terms of the
second contract would be the" same with a few exceptions. In fact, of the
thirty-four clauses in the Bloomer Girl contract, thirty-one were
identical.' 7  The second contract eliminated the clause giving her
approval rights regarding the dance director (since there would be none)
and modified her approval rights of the director and the screenplay.
There are hints in the record that the BCBM offer was not entirely
sincere. Her agent stated in his declaration that Fox had informed him
in December 1965 that BCBM was off schedule, and if it were to be done
at all, it would probably be in 1967.18 In the March discussion of the
termination of the Bloomer Girl project, Richard Zanuck (Fox's Executive
Vice President in Charge of Production) purportedly told MacLaine's
agent that the script was much better now and could be produced in July
or August 1966.11 Both her lawyer and the judge pointed to Fox's
failure to name the proposed director and the leading man as evidence that
the offer was somewhat questionable.2' Fox's counsel characterized the
lower court's response in strong terms: "The lower court apparently
believed that defendant's offer, and its affirmative defense, were
photoplay as originally contemplated. Therefore, we cannot and will not
utilize your services as contemplated by the Agreement nor otherwise comply
with our obligations to you under that Agreement.
In order to avoid any damage to you, the Corporation hereby offers to
employ you to portray the leading feminine role in a photoplay tentatively
entitled "Big Country, Big Man," which role you previously expressed
interest in performing.
Respondent's Brief, supra note 7, at 7.
14. See Respondent's Answer, supra note 10, at 18. The record is silent on the
identity of the director and whether that director was still associated with the project when
it was proposed in 1966.
15. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 7, at 48.
16. See Respondent's Answer, supra note 10, at 18.
17. For a listing of the clauses, see Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 7, at
29-30.
18. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 7, at 48.
19. See id. at 77.
20. See id. at 78; Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 221,
225 n.5 (Ct. App. 1969).
1056
Bloomer Girl Revisited
outrageous and in bad faith and expressed those sentiments in its strangely
argumentative language at the conclusion of its Opinion."21 In his
declaration, Zanuck claimed the offer was "a bonafide good faith offer
and the defendant would have complied with the terms of that offer, had
plaintiff accepted them."' Fox's sincerity would have been a fact
question and probably would have survived the summary judgment
motion.
MacLaine refused the substitute offer and, according to her agent,
was unable to find alternative employment during the Bloomer Girl
shooting period.' She brought suit against Fox to recover the $750,000
guarantee, 24 stating two causes of action: money due under a written
contract, and damages for breach of a written contract. 5 She rejected
a settlement offer of $400,000.26 Fox conceded that it had breached the
original agreement and offered as its only defense her failure to mitigate
damages by her refusal to accept the BCBM offer. Her failure to
mitigate, claimed Fox, meant that MacLaine should receive only nominal
damages.27 On a very thin record consisting of the Bloomer Girl
contract, Fox's letter proposing the BCBM contract, short declarations by
her agent and lawyer, Fox's in-house counsel, and Richard Zanuck, an
affidavit by MacLaine that she did not work or receive compensation
during the fourteen week shooting period, and a few stipulations,
MacLaine asked for and received summary judgment. That result was
upheld on appeal.
21. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 7, at 40.
22. Id. at 52.
23. See id. at 4.
24. Actually, she sued for the $50,000 expenses as well, but the parties stipulated
that since the expenses would not be incurred if the studio exercised its pay-or-play
option, she would have no right to recover them. See Respondent's Answer, supra note
10, at 20.
25. See Parker, 474 P.2d at 691.
26. This fact was included in the Declaration of her lawyer and was noted in the
dissent in the supreme court. See id. at 697 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
27. That is, $750,000-$750,000=$0. Oddly, one of the leading casebooks gets
this wrong:
If the court had ruled that the refusal of the second film constituted a
failure to mitigate, how would Ms. MacLaine have fared on the obstacle to
recovery then presented-showing the difference in value in appearing in "Big
Country" rather than "Bloomer Girl"? Students often miss the point that had
she lost this case, she is nevertheless entitled to be compensated as if she had
accepted the role in "Big Country."
JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 22 (Teacher's Manual 7th
ed. 1998).
10571998:1051
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II. THE OPINIONS
A. Superior Court
The case was first heard by Judge Zack in Superior Court.' He
rejected Fox's mitigation defense both because the pay-or-play clause
meant that no mitigation was necessary and, even if it were, the proposed
alternative was "different and inferior." Judge Zack provided a
straightforward characterization of the pay-or-play clause:
The contract . . . is one in which the Defendant said, in
substance, "We contemplate making a motion picture called
'Bloomer Girl.' We desire your services as 'Evalina', the star
thereof, to be filmed during a certain period, in Los Angeles,
California. If the picture is made and if you appear
recognizably in the photoplay, as released, and the contract has
not otherwise been validly terminated, we will pay you the
guaranteed compensation, the expenses, and the percentage of
the gross. Also, if the picture is made, you shall have absolute
(subject to contingencies) approval of the director (Paragraph
29), reasonable approval of the dance director (Paragraph 31),
and absolute approval of the screenplay for the photoplay
(Paragraph 32)."
However, Defendant also says: "We do not promise we
will ever make the picture or if we do, you will ever appear in
it as released. The sole binding promise we make here and now
(Paragraph 2) is that we will pay, in exchange for your
commitment to perform at our election as provided in the
agreement, the guaranteed compensation."
Thus defendant is not liable to Plaintiff, under Paragraph 2, for
failure to make the picture or for failure to have Plaintiff appear
in it. Since Defendant elected not to proceed prior to the time
Plaintiff's performance was to commence, Defendant's only
enforceable promise now is to pay the guaranteed
compensation.29
28. . His opinion is reprinted as an Appendix to Respondent's Brief in the Court
of Appeals, Parker (Civ. No. 33270) [hereinafter Appendix to Respondent's Briefn.
29. Id. at 6-7. At some point between the show's Broadway run and the court
appearance, her character's name appears to have undergone a spelling change.
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The clause, said the court, amounted to a waiver of any right to have
damages mitigated. 30 Fox's admitted breach was not its failure to make
the movie-it had never promised that. The breach was only the failure
to pay the guaranteed compensation at the promised time. Judge Zack
had a rather stinging characterization of Fox's position:
To destroy all rights under a contract, to assist a
wrongdoer, is unconscionable. To paraphrase: Defendant is
saying: "Yes, we admit we signed a contract giving you
approval of director and subject matter in a picture, if we made
it. We also admit that, provided you are not in default, the
contract requires us, in any event, to pay the guaranteed
compensation. But there is another unwritten clause in the deal,
resulting from the rule of mitigation of damages which allows
us to compel you to perform on our terms if you are to recover
anything on the 'Bloomer Girl' Contract. Under this unwritten
clause we either get your performance on our terms, or we get
off scot free. It works like this: We totally breach the contract
and make an offer to employ at the same salary, but this time on
terms we dictate. If you accept the offer and sue us on the
original contract, we can demur you out because Paragraph 2
eliminates all covenants other than the one to pay money. You
have received the money; we are not liable for failure of the
other conditions to occur because we did not promise they
would. On the other hand, if you do not accept the later offer
to perform on terms which only we decide, and then sue us for
breach of the original agreement, we have a complete defense
of failure to mitigate damages. Take your choice.""
If MacLaine did have to mitigate, under the stipulated facts the only
mitigation possible would have been acceptance of Fox's offer to star in
BCBM. Neither this opinion nor the two appellate opinions had to
confront issues arising from an employment offer from a third party
(although it comes up indirectly in the discussion of "offset").32 Judge
Zack ruled that, as a matter of law, the alternative employment was
different and inferior and, therefore, she did not have to accept it. While
he noted the differences in the films-a musical to be filmed in
30. See id. at 18. Fox relied on the conclusory Declaration of its Resident
counsel, Frank Ferguson: "Nothing in Article 2 is intended to nor does it relate to any
advance waiver by the producer of the doctrine of mitigation of damage." Appellant's
Opening Brief, supra note 7, at 13.
31. Appendix to Respondent's Brief, supra note 28, at 27-28.
32. See infra text accompanying note 34.
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Hollywood versus a western to be filmed in Australia-he put no weight
on those factors in determining that the substitute was different and
inferior. Rather, he emphasized artistic control, MacLaine's approval of
the director, and the screenplay:
Failure of Defendant to show ... any facts at all, as to the
comparability of the employments, leaves the Court in a
position where there is only one conclusion that can be
reasonably drawn from the absence of screenplay and director
control in the second employment, and that is that these powers
were important.33
MacLaine did not have to work; but what if she had done so? Could
she keep the income from the other employment, or would Fox's liability
be reduced? The court emphatically stated that she would be required to
offset her earnings: "Plaintiff ... would have to deduct. . . all earnings,
even those as a seamstress, during the contracted period of 'Bloomer Girl'
employment.'"I
B. The Court of Appeal
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Kingsley upheld the grant of
summary judgment but on quite different grounds.35 The difference
stems from his interpretation of MacLaine's position:
Plaintiffs cause of action, therefore, is not actually for a
breach of her employment contract by an unlawful discharge;
rather it is for a recovery under the contract according to its
terms. The parties also are in agreement that defendant's
alternative obligation to pay plaintiff $750,000 if it did not
utilize her services in "Bloomer Girl" was subject to an implied
condition that she mitigate defendant's obligation by accepting
other suitable employment.36
He expands on this in a cryptic footnote:
We have decided the case at bench on the theory stated in
the text. Since it was tried below, and was briefed and argued
33. Appendix to Respondent's Brief, supra note 28, at 23.
34. Id. at 19.
35. See Parker, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
36. Id.
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here, on that theory, we assume that the parties have correctly
interpreted their mutual intention as to the particular contract
herein involved. Our acceptance of the theory of mitigation for
the purpose of this opinion, however, is not a determination
that, in some other lawsuit, involving other parties to another
similar contract, the validity of that theory might not be
raised.37
Judge Kingsley's meaning is not entirely clear. I interpret this to
mean that the pay-or-play provision would normally mean that MacLaine
need not mitigate, but in this particular case and for purposes of summary
judgment only, she conceded that she would have to accept an offer of
comparable employment in mitigation. How he came to this
interpretation, I do not know. He does not hold that the trial court erred.
Perhaps her lawyer took this position in oral argument, but the written
record does not support Judge Kingsley's characterization. Fox's counsel,
in its Opening Brief to the Court of Appeal, criticized the lower court's
treatment of the pay-or-play clause "as being vitally significant-so much
so, that the Court ruled that its very existence waived the only defense
defendant proffered to the Complaint, the alleged failure of plaintiff to
mitigate damages."38 "Plaintiff," argued Fox, "took the position that, as
a matter of law, employees could sit out their term of employment
without mitigating and that if she were wrong about this, defendant's
affirmative defense 'would indeed present a triable issue of fact'." 39
That hardly sounds like agreement on an implied condition that she
mitigate. Indeed, in its Petition for Rehearing, Fox claimed that the two
quoted passages from Judge Kingsley's opinion were inaccurate "because
plaintiff never so agreed. "'
Plaintiff, in fact, did not back off from her claim that she was
entitled to the compensation regardless of whether she had attempted to
mitigate:
It is that right of Respondent's-to receive the $750,000
anyway, even if not used in "Bloomer Girl," which Appellant
is seeking to take away from Respondent through the
"mitigation" device. In other words, an express contractual
provision which in effect eliminated mitigation by providing that
Respondent was to be paid even if not used in "Bloomer Girl"
37. Id. at 223 n.3.
38. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 7, at 12.
39. Id. at 49.
40. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing in the Court of Appeal at 9, Parker (Civ.
No. 33270).
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is being threatened by Appellant's "mitigation" theory. If that
theory were given effect, it would render meaningless
Respondent's express contractual right to be paid under the
"Bloomer Girl" contract, even if her services were not used.
And, of course, Respondent paid dearly for that contractual
right, among other things because she turned down an offer of
$1,000,000 plus royalties from Columbia Pictures, because of
the necessity to hold herself in readiness for "Bloomer Girl"
during the period indicated.
Her sole present right of action, because of the election reserved
to Appellant in the last unnumbered paragraph of Paragraph 2
of the "Bloomer Girl" contract, is to have the guaranteed
compensation.4
Having determined that there was an implied condition that she
mitigate, Judge Kingsley then had to give it content. There being no law
regarding the failure to mitigate the non-breach of a contract, the court
turned to the only analogy available, mitigation of damages in unlawful
discharge cases. Like Judge Zack, Judge Kingsley concluded that as a
matter of law, the tendered employment was different and inferior; unlike
Judge Zack, he did not rely solely on the artistic control issues:
It is obvious that the two plays differed widely: One was a
musical with opportunities for plaintiff to display her talents as
a singer and dancer; the substitute offered no such opportunity.
One was to be filmed in Los Angeles; the other in a foreign
country. As to one, plaintiff had the right of detailed script
approval; as to the other, she was required to accept a script
already fixed. In one, she was to work under the direction
either of a director named in the contract and, thus, approved
by her in its execution, or by some other director satisfactory to
her; in the substitute, she would work under a different director
in whose selection she had had, and would have, no voice at all.
Those differences are of a kind that, as a matter of common
knowledge, are all significant to a star performer. The question
is not whether or not plaintiff would have been wise to have
accepted the offered substitute role. Her duty to defendant was
not to exercise the wisest professional judgment. It was merely
41. Respondent's Brief, supra note 7, at 37-38.
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to accept employment that did not differ substantially from that
which the original contract contemplated. Plaintiff had been
employed in Los Angeles, to appear in a musical, based on a
stage play of established reputation, under the direction of a
director in whom she had confidence, using a script she had
approved. She was offered employment in a foreign country,
to appear in a non-musical, under a director whom she did not
know or trust, and using a script which (so far as defendant's
affidavits show) she had read only once and as to which she had
indicated, at the most, only a general approval and not a
detailed one. Those differences were substantial within the
meaning of the cases in the field. The trial court properly ruled
that, as a matter of law, plaintiff had no duty to defendant to
accept its substitute role.42
C. The California Supreme Court
In the California Supreme Court's decision, the one prominently
featured in all the casebooks, the existence of the pay-or-play clause was
acknowledged in a footnote, but it warranted no discussion from either the
majority or the lone dissenter.43 The entire discussion centered on
whether the second offer was different and inferior as a matter of law.
"[T]he sole issue," said the court, "is whether plaintiff's refusal of
defendant's substitute offer . . . may be used in mitigation."" The
majority said that it could not. The nature of the project made it
different, and the loss of the screenplay and director approvals made it
inferior.45 The dissent observes that the majority's conclusion amounts
42. Parker, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25 (footnotes omitted).
43. The majority opinion concluded by noting that its finding on the "different and
inferior" issue made consideration of the pay-or-play provision unnecessary:
In view of the determination that defendant failed to present any facts
showing the existence of a factual issue with respect to its sole
defense-plaintiff's rejection of its substitute employment offer in mitigation
of damages-we need not consider plaintiff's further contention that for
various reasons, including the provisions of the original contract ... plaintiff
was excused from attempting to mitigate damages.
Parker, 474 P.2d at 694.
44. Id. at 692-93.
45. The majority asserted:
The mere circumstance that "Bloomer Girl" was to be a musical review
calling upon plaintiff's talents as a dancer as well as an actress, and was to be
produced in the City of Los Angeles, whereas "Big Country" was a straight
dramatic role in a "Western Type" story taking place in an opal mine in
Australia, demonstrates the difference in kind between the two employments;
the female lead as a dramatic actress in a western style motion picture can by
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to proof by repetition and goes on to claim that the relative merits of the
second film were not so obvious that they could be determined without
more facts.46
The court's emphasis on the "different and inferior" question and
the scant attention it gave to the pay-or-play provision were only partially
dictated by the parties' briefs. True, the bulk of their arguments
addressed aspects of the mitigation defense.47 And when the parties did
raise the pay-or-play issue, the presentation was less than crystal clear.
Nonetheless, the arguments were available to the court, which simply
chose to ignore them.
Fox presented seven arguments; the first six concerned the mitigation
defense. The seventh was most strange. The court of appeal, said Fox,
erred when it stated that the suit was not for unlawful discharge, but for
recovery under the contract according to its terms. It further erred when
it said the plaintiff had agreed that she would have to mitigate damages.
Fox claimed that it had anticipatorily repudiated and breached its contract
and that MacLaine had been discharged; both parties had, Fox noted,
stipulated to those facts. "Moreover, not only did plaintiff never agree
that defendant's obligation to pay $750,000 was subject to an implied
condition that she mitigate damages, plaintiff vigorously contended quite
no stretch of imagination be considered the equivalent of or substantially
similar to the lead in a song-and-dance production.
Additionally, the substitute "Big Country" offer proposed to eliminate
or impair the director and screenplay approvals accorded to plaintiff under the
original "Bloomer Girl" contract, and thus constituted an offer of inferior
employment.
Id. at 693-94 (citation omitted).
46. See id. at 696-97 (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting).
47. For example, Plaintiff framed the dispute in terms of the mitigation defense:
[T]he various admissions by Appellant in its pleadings and declarations and
the various undenied facts and stipulated facts in this case all narrowed the
issues to the mitigation defense. Even as to that one defense, it was further
limited to the question of whether one particular alternate offer of employment
by Appellant to Respondent constituted a mandatory mitigation opportunity for
her.
Respondent's Answer, supra note 10, at 4. Still, Plaintiff did argue that the contract did
not require mitigation:
Respondent had the right in "Bloomer Girl" to be paid her $750,000.00 even
if the Appellant did not utilize her services in or in connection with the
Photoplay. But in the "Big Country, Big Man" proposal, Respondent's right
to receive the $750,000.00 from Appellant under the "Bloomer Girl" contract
regardless of whether her services were utilized therein-and even if they
were not-was to be expressly eliminated.
Id. at 14.
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the opposite."' Thus, when the court of appeal declared "(1) this was
not a case involving an unlawful discharge and (2) plaintiff had agreed
that her right to receive $750,000 was subject to an implied condition to
mitigate damages, it was inaccurate in the extreme."49 If the court had
been correct in labeling this a contract still in force, Fox contended, the
mitigation defense would fail. It cited Payne v. Pathe Studios, Inc.,'
which concerned a studio's liability under a pay-or-play clause for failure
to make a film: "Here again we must bear in mind that this is not an
action for damages for breach of the contract of employment, but an
action on the contract itself for the agreed compensation. The doctrine
of mitigation of damages has no place in such an action."5
Fox concluded by noting that the "inconsistency" with Payne "cannot
help but lend confusion and inconsistency in what has been heretofore
well settled law."52 This all seems like a pretty powerful argument, but
for the plaintiff. The law is well settled that in a pay-or-play contract
there is no place for mitigation-the plaintiff simply receives the
guarantee. Fox's twist is the one described derisively by Judge Zack. By
announcing a breach, Fox breached the promise to employ (which is
subject to the mitigation defense), not the promise to pay (which is not).
That argument seems extraordinarily silly. Neither the court of appeal
nor the supreme court overtly recognized it; but it is the implicit core of
their analyses.
D. The Precedents
To be fair, the courts' failure to recognize the nature of the pay-or-
play clause was not entirely their fault. While MacLaine did argue that
the clause did not require her to mitigate, she did not even attempt to
relate the case to the few other reported cases involving such a clause.
In her lengthy briefs, she mentioned only one and did not bother to note
that the case involved a pay-or-play clause. That case, de la Falaise v.
Gaumont-British Picture Corp., ' was the only case concerning a pay-or-
play clause cited by any of the courts. And, like the plaintiff, their
invocation of the case ignored the pay-or-play nature of the contract.
Fox, however, called three other cases to the court's attention.
48. Appellant's Petition for Hearing in Supreme Court at 25, Parker (L.A. No.
29705) [hereinafter Appellant's Petition for Hearing].
49. Id. at 26.
50. 44 P.2d 598 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935). The case will be discussed below.
51. Id. at 600.
52. Appellant's Petition for Hearing, supra note 48, at 26.
53. 103 P.2d 447 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940).
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The four cases taken together provide a good picture of the role of
pay-or-play clauses. They also illustrate how, by forcing their analyses
into Procrustean categories, the courts manage to make simple questions
difficult. I will consider the four cases in chronological order.
1. Zasu Pitts (Payne v. Pathe Studios, Inc.'): Pitts entered into a
contract in May 1930 with Pathe Studios to star in Beyond Victory, to be
completed before the end of December of that year. She was to receive
a guarantee of $5000, to be paid regardless of whether or not the picture
was made. 5 Her salary was to be $1250 per week for a minimum of
four weeks. The film was not made and Pitts (or rather her assignee)
sued for the guaranteed amount. The opinion is silent on whether the
filming was expected to take longer, but I think it a reasonable inference
that it was not. Despite cancellation of the one film, Pitts still managed
to appear in thirteen films that year.56 She prevailed, with the court
finding that this was "not an action for damages for breach of the contract
of employment, but an action on the contract itself for the agreed
compensation." 57 Because of this, said the court, there was no occasion
to mitigate. Any earnings between May and the end of December would
not be offset against the $5000 obligation. The court noted that "she was
employed and received compensation during a large portion of the period
in question," s but that did not preclude her fully performing the
contract.
The court observed: "The question whether this contract was an
option in favor of defendant on the services of [Pitts], to be exercised at
will, or was an agreement to engage her services for at least four weeks
with a guarantee of $5000 as a minimum compensation, became a
question of fact for the trial court to determine."59 If the latter, the
court would have had to deal with the question of whether the $5000 was
liquidated damages or a penalty. It is a distinction without a difference.
The court managed to convince itself of the former so it did not have to
deal with the doctrinal niceties of liquidated damages. Of more interest
than the doctrinal smokescreen is the court's characterization of the clause
as an option. Pathe paid Pitts $5000 to be ready to make a particular film
54. 44 P.2d 598.
55. See id. at 599 ("It is understood and agreed that in the event your services are
not started on or before December 31, 1930, we hereby agree to pay you the total sum
of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), which represents the four weeks guarantee on this
agreement.").
56. See Internet Movie Database (visited Sept. 19, 1998) <http://us.imdb.
com/Name?Pitts, + ZaSu >.
57. Payne, 44 P.2d at 600.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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in a seven month period, but Pathe retained the right to cancel the film
or to make the film with someone else.
2. Constance Bennett (de la Falaise v. Gaumont-British Picture
Corp.'): Constance Bennett agreed to make two films in London in
1936, each to be made in eight weeks or less. The first was completed,
but the second never made. Her compensation for each picture was ten
percent of the American gross receipts to be offset against a guarantee of
$30,000. In addition, she would receive a guaranteed $5000 which was
not to be recouped from her share of the gross receipts. 6' The start date
for the second picture was to be between September 1 and November 14,
and the studio promised to give notice of the starting date by August 1.
The studio sought to cancel the contract in the spring of 1936, but she
refused; the studio failed to give notice of a start date on August 1,
whereupon she sued the studio for the $35,000 minimum guarantee.
In its defense, the studio noted that Bennett had begun working on
a picture for Twentieth Century Fox in July (Ladies in Love), and that
this would relieve them of their duty to notify on August 1. However,
the court found, she would have been able to complete that film in time
to appear in England by September 1, so her behavior did not excuse the
studio. The only issue was whether any employment she had taken
between September 1 and January 1 should be offset against the $35,000
guarantee. She received no movie offers during the period, but did
perform in two radio programs, receiving $4000 for the two.
The court distinguished this case from Payne "which, instead of
being an action for breach of contract, was based upon the failure of
respondent to pay the minimum compensation specified in an agreement
very similar to the one here involved." '62 Because Payne was not an
action for breach of contract, the doctrine of mitigation did not apply.
Since this was an action for breach of contract, the doctrine would apply.
This is a most peculiar syllogism, given that the action is for precisely the
same thing-payment of the guarantee after the studio chose not to go
forward.
The court cited the "well settled" rule that the damages for wrongful
discharge were the salary less the amount the employee might have earned
with reasonable effort from other employment; the employee need not
60. 103 P.2d 447. Henri Falaise, Marquis de la Coudraye was the third of her
five husbands. According to her mini-biography, "she feuded with the press and enjoyed
lawsuits." Rod Crawford, Internet Movie Database (visited Sept. 29, 1998)
<http://us.imdb.com/B io?Bennett, + Constance>.
61. So, if the American gross receipts were less than $300,000, she would receive
$35,000. For every dollar of gross receipts above $300,000, she would receive an
additional ten percent.
62. de la Falaise, 103 P.2d at 452.
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enter into service that was different or inferior to mitigate damages. The
rule, the same one at issue in Parker, was even less relevant here.
Bennett had not turned down any alternative employment; she had
accepted employment on radio. The court conflated two distinct
questions: (1) should the defendant's damages be reduced by the revenues
the plaintiff should have earned (but didn't) in mitigation; and (2) should
the plaintiff's actual earnings be offset against the damages. Having so
boxed itself in, the court extricated itself with a nonsensical argument.
The radio engagement, said the court, "might be denominated different
in character from that required of a moving picture actress, [but] it cannot
be said to be inferior thereto."' The radio earnings would, therefore,
be offset against the damages so that she recovered only $31,000.
3. Pare Lorentz (Lorentz v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. 4): Lorentz
agreed to write, direct, and produce a movie for $50,000 plus ten percent
of the net profits. The picture was over budget and behind schedule, and
the studio finally stopped production. Lorentz already had received the
$50,000; he sued for a number of items, including the percentage
compensation he would have earned and the lost screen credits. The
relevant contract clause was written in the form of a waiver.' In
granting the studio summary judgment on these claims, the court
explained why it made sense for the studio to maintain the option of
replacing the director or terminating the project:
[T]he contract makes employment certain and as well the
payment of the fixed compensation. Such obligation is fixed,
but the work to be done and the results of the work must remain
in the sound discretion of the moving picture corporation. The
expensive business enterprise may by the turn of events at any
time indicate the wisdom of discontinuing the production or the
showing of a photoplay. Should events of such portent occur,
the corporation is absolved from liability from prospective
benefits to appellant. Appellee has reserved decision on such
question to its own discretion.'
63. Id.
64. 155 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1946).
65. See id. at 86 ("The Producer expressly waives and releases the corporation
from all claims or causes of action based on the failure of the Corporation actually to
utilize the services of the Producer or the results thereof, or on the failure of the
Corporation to produce or to release or to continue the distribution of the Pictures;
provided, however, that nothing contained in this Article of this agreement shall be
deemed to relieve the Corporation of its obligation to pay the Producer the fixed
compensation payable to him pursuant to Article 1 of Section 11 of this Agreement.").
66. Id.
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4. Ann Sheridan (RKO Pictures, Inc. v. Sheridan7): In April 1949,
Sheridan accepted the leading female role in a motion picture entitled
Carriage Entrance. Her fee was $50,000 plus an additional $100,000
that was to be paid out of the gross receipts of the picture. The contract
gave Sheridan approval of the script, the director, and the leading man.
At the time she signed the contract Sheridan also signed a letter stating
that she approved the script, director, and Robert Young as the leading
male actor. Young subsequently rejected the role, and the parties could
not agree on an adequate replacement. In August, RKO sent Sheridan a
letter stating that it would not use her in the picture and would not pay
her any compensation.
The dispute involved two mechanical issues with respect to the pay-
or-play clause: What event would trigger the clause and, if it were
triggered, what compensation should be paid? Neither the purpose of a
pay-or-play clause nor the mitigation defense were at stake. The clause,
which included an awkwardly worded proviso, read as follows:
"Producer shall not be required to use Artist's services hereunder or to
complete the production of 'Carriage Entrance,' and shall be deemed to
have fully performed all its obligations to Artist by paying Artist the
minimum compensation payable to Artist hereunder."' The clause
continued:
However, if, because Artist does not approve any one or more
of the items specified in paragraph 1 [the director, script, and
leading man], Artist does not become obligated to, and does
not, render any services pursuant hereto, Producer shall not be
required to pay any compensation whatever to Artist
hereunder.'
RKO argued that the last sentence meant that the pay-or-play
obligation would not be triggered if Sheridan failed to act in good faith
by not approving the alternative leading men they had proposed or if she
did not render any services under the contract. The court held that the
contract said "and" and meant "and." Even if she had unreasonably
withheld approval of alternative leading men, as long as she had rendered
some services the clause would be in effect. Since the jury had found that
her consultations regarding costumes and her fittings of gowns were
services rendered pursuant to the contract, the clause was triggered.
67. 195 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1952).
68. Id. at 169.
69. Id. at 168.
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Sheridan argued that the trial judge erred by ruling as a matter of law
that the phrase "minimum compensation" meant $50,000. The phrase,
she argued (and the court agreed), was definitely ambiguous and parol
evidence should have been admitted; the case was remanded on this point.
I find the first conclusion more compelling than the second. At
worst, the second issue involves a one-shot drafting snafu that easily
could be rectified by making clear that the minimum compensation and
the guaranteed payment are one and the same. The first issue was
highlighted by awkward drafting, but the problem can be deeper. The
studio's pay-or-play obligation has to be triggered by a specific event;
only in some circumstances would that event be the signing of the
contract. In the other four contracts considered in this Section (Parker,
Payne, de la Falaise, and Lorentz), the pay-or-play obligation began the
instant the contract had been entered into. But, as Sheridan illustrates,
that need not be the case.
5. In sum: This tour of the precedents suggests that while the raw
materials for a sensible analysis of Parker were there, they would be easy
to miss. The outcomes were not so bad,7' and there was some
awareness of the function of the pay-or-play clause. But the attempt to
pigeonhole the facts into traditional legal categories did more to obscure
than to enlighten. The opacity of the precedents is illustrated starkly by
the failure of the Parker litigants (and courts) to appreciate their
implications. Three were raised by Fox's counsel, not MacLaine's,
despite the fact that they should support her claim. Fox failed to
recognize that by calling these cases to the court's attention, it was really
undermining its own case. And the plaintiff returned the favor. Only one
of the cases, de la Falaise, was cited by the plaintiff and the courts, and
then only for the proposition that mitigation does not require the plaintiff
to take employment that was different and inferior.
III. PAY-OR-PLAY
The essential features of a pay-or-play clause were spelled out in a
decision contemporaneous with Parker by none other than Judge
Kingsley. The issue arose in the context of a divorce.7 Carroll Baker
had a seven-picture deal with Paramount, in which she had agreed to
perform in at least one picture per year. Paramount agreed to pay her a
fixed fee each year whether or not she worked, the fee being $200,000
70. Offsetting Constance Bennett's radio earnings was probably wrong, but
defensible as a default rule; the Sheridan court's acceptance of parol evidence was almost
certainly a stretch.
71. See Garfein v. Garfein, 93 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Ct. App. 1971).
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per year in the early years and $300,000 in the later years. After she
starred in Harlow, a 1965 release, Paramount did not call on her to make
any more pictures. Paramount attempted to renege, prompting Baker to
sue, and the court, in an unpublished opinion, found in her favor. In the
divorce proceedings, the issue facing the court of appeal was whether the
final $1.2 million of payments under the pay-or-play clause should be
treated as property, as the husband contended, or future earnings.' The
court found the latter. Judge Kingsley spelled out clearly the meaning of
the pay-or-play clause:
[The contract] required the wife to hold herself available for
service in one picture each twelve-month period; without the
consent of Paramount she could not accept other potentially
conflicting engagements, business or social. .... [Footnote:
"Under the contract, plaintiff could perform for another
producer, provided she gave Paramount notice of her intent; in
that event, Paramount was required either to consent or to
schedule her for its own picture at the time or times involved. "]
The husband argues that the several payments were not
"earnings" because the wife was entitled to them even though
she did not "work"- i.e., appear in any motion pictures. But
appearance in a picture was only one alternative of her
obligations to her employer under the contract. Under a "play
or pay" contract, the employer secures: (1) an option on the
performer's services; and (2) the assurance that a performer will
not, without its consent, create competition for other pictures of
the employer by performing for some other producer. "They
also serve who only sit and wait." We hold that the wife
"earns" her agreed compensation by refraining from performing
for anyone except the employer during the period of the
contract, unless with the employer's consent. [Footnote: "The
effect of the contract, obviously, was to limit plaintiff in
bargaining with other producers and subjected her to losing the
opportunity to appear in pictures for other producers, which she
might regard as important to her career or her bank account."]
Since the payments made after June 1967, were "earned" after
that date, they were separate property. [Footnote: "The duty to
72. The amount was for payments falling due after the date of separation. See
id. at 716-17.
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pay, where no picture was made, did not accrue until the final
day of each 12-month period, since the wife was required to
hold herself available for the full period. The compensation,
thus, was not 'earned' until that last day."]'
Judge Kingsley turns Parker on its head. A pay-or-play clause does
not require the talent to seek reasonable employment alternatives to
mitigate damages. Rather, he suggests, it gives the studio the power to
prevent the talent from working with a rival studio for a period of time.
It is not clear whether this drastically revised vision reflects rapid learning
on the part of Judge Kingsley; perhaps he already knew it and this
knowledge was the basis for his cryptic footnote in Parker. What is clear
is that for the last quarter century this alternative understanding of the
pay-or-play clause has been on the books and was put there by the
intermediate court judge who helped create Parker.
Carroll Baker's Paramount contract differed from the five discussed
in the previous Section. While those were all for specific films to be
made in a reasonably well-defined time slot, the Baker contract was for
seven unidentified (and unidentifiable at the time of contract) films to be
made over a seven-year period. This, along with the Sheridan contract's
variation on the triggering mechanism, underscores the point that not all
pay-or-play clauses are created equal.
The two basic features, however, remain those identified by Judge
Kingsley: the studio has paid for the option of using the talent for some
time period, and the talent has agreed not to work for someone else
during that period unless it receives the studio's permission or pays for
the privilege. Indeed, these features are memorialized in the union
contracts. The Director's Guild agreement, for example, says that if the
director is employed by a third party, the employer "shall be entitled to
an offset of the compensation arising from such new employment for such
remaining portion of the guaranteed period against the compensation
remaining unpaid. [However,] the Director shall have no obligation to
mitigate damages arising from his or her removal."'74
A. The Studio's Option
Movie-making is a sequential process. A studio might begin with a
concept, hire a screenwriter to draft a screenplay, hire the director and
actors and other talent, and, if all goes smoothly, a finished feature film
73. Id. at 716-17 (footnotes omitted).
74. 1990 DGA Basic Agreement § 6-105, cited in 3 THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL.,
ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 27.10, at 34 (2d ed. Supp. 1997).
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will be the result. But things do not always run smoothly. Most projects
do not make it to the screen. Indeed, most die early before the studio has
invested a significant amount.75 Even if a project does not die, its
course can change constantly as circumstances or information change.
The screenplay can be revised, another studio might be coming to market
with a movie about a similar subject, a particular star might become
available, the co-stars might lack chemistry, and so forth.76 By
maintaining the flexibility to react, the studio can adapt the project to
changed circumstances. As the primary claimant on the film's earnings,
the studio has the incentive to make adaptive decisions that enhance the
expected value of the project.'
However, other participants must make decisions that depend on the
likelihood that the project will go forward, and they do not want their
interests to be totally ignored. Prior to 1950, when much of the talent
was under long-term contract to the studios and studios produced a large
number of films, the studios internalized these concerns. If Ms. X was
dropped from a particular film, the studio still had to pay her salary. The
studio held a portfolio of talent. If someone were dropped from one film,
or a project canceled, the studio had a large number of other projects in
the works so that the studio's cost of carrying an inventory of contract
players was not great. As the number of films produced declined, the
long-term contracts disappeared.78 Talent was hired largely on a film-
by-film basis, and the studio had to pay for the talent's readiness on that
basis as well. (The per picture contracts of Constance Bennett and Zasu
Pitts were exceptions in their era, as was Carroll Baker's in the present
era.) In the studio contracts of the 1930s and 1940s, the studio
determined which roles the actor would play. If the actor refused, the
studio could suspend the actor. 79 The actor would not be compensated
75. See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 538.
76. For descriptions of the evolution of various film projects, see STEVEN BACH
FINAL CUT: DREAMS AND DISASTER IN THE MAKING OF HEAVEN'S GATE (1985); SPIKE
LEE, BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF THE MAKING OF
MALCOLMX (1992); SIDNEY PINK, SO YOU WANT TO MAKE MOVIES (1989) (independent
films, most filmed in Europe); JULIE SALAMON, THE DEVIL'S CANDY: THE BONFIRE OF
THE VANITIES GOES TO HOLLYWOOD (1991); and THOMAS SCHATZ, THE GENIUS OF THE
SYSTEM (1988) (major studio films from 1930-1950).
77. See Goldberg, supra note 7, at 538-42.
78. In the 1930s, the major studios turned out nearly 400 films a year; in the
1960s, the number had fallen to less than 200. See Mark Weinstein, Profit-Sharing
Contracts in Hollywood: Evolution and Analysis, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 71 tbl.1 (1998).
79. The standard contract was described in De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 153 P.2d 983 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944):
The contract gave the Producer, defendant, the right to suspend plaintiff for
any period or periods when she should fail, refuse or neglect to perform her
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while on suspension, and the clock would stop running. That is, the
suspension time would be tacked on to the end of the contract.' In
modem multi-picture agreements, the actor has some discretion as to
acceptance of a particular role.
The opportunity cost of accepting a contract for a particular film
project is the offers that might come along in the intervening months. In
Shirley MacLaine's case, at least one offer, Casino Royale, was
foreclosed by her acceptance of the Bloomer Girl contract. If the studio
were free to adjust without taking this opportunity cost (or reliance) into
account, the talent would be reluctant to commit to the project in the first
place. The pay-or-play clause provides some protection of the artist's
reliance. It is analogous to the "take-or-pay" s1 or "demand charge"82
often used in long-term supply contracts.3 The seller (the artist) is
promised some compensation even if the buyer (the studio) chooses to
take nothing at all. Shirley MacLaine is to receive the $750,000 even if
services to the full limit of her ability and as instructed by the Producer and
for any additional period or periods required to complete the portrayal of a
role refused by plaintiff and assigned to another artist. Plaintiff was to receive
no compensation while so suspended or thereafter until she offered to resume
her work. It was provided that the Producer had the right to extend the term
of the contract at its option, for a time equal to the periods of suspension.
Id. at 984. Olivia DeHavilland (the court is quite free with the spelling of her name) had
been suspended for twenty-five weeks over the course of her seven year contract. The
court continued:
The several periods of suspension totaled some twenty-five weeks. The facts
as to the suspensions are not in dispute; defendant's right to impose them is
not questioned. Plaintiffs reason for refusing the several roles was that they
were unsuited to her matured ability and that she could not faithfully and
conscientiously portray them. Her good faith and motives are not in issue,
but according to the contract the Producer was the sole judge in such matter
and she had to do as she was told.
Id. at 984-85.
80. In De Haviland, the court voided contract extensions beyond seven years. See
id. at 986.
81. See, e.g., Independent Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248,
1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Diamond Shamrock Exploration Corp. v. Hodel. 853 F.2d 1159,
1164 (5th Cir. 1988).
82. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53, 58 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
83. The contracts between oil refineries selling petroleum coke and their
aluminum company purchasers used a variety of devices (including "standby" charges and
nonlinear pricing) to protect the seller's reliance while granting the buyer some discretion
over the quantity. See Victor P. Goldberg & John R. Erickson, Quantity and Price
Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J.L. & ECON.
369, 378-82 (1987); see also Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity
Contracts: Reining in Good Faith (unpublished manuscript).
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the movie is not made. By reducing the incremental costs of
continuation, these devices provide some protection to the seller's
(artist's) reliance, balancing that reliance interest against the buyer's
(studio's) need for flexibility. The parties leave the decision to proceed
entirely in the hands of the studio with pay-or-play merely altering the
prices it faces.'
The assurance is not given lightly. Recall that Shirley MacLaine's
contract negotiations took seven months and were not concluded until the
parties had agreed on the director. The record is silent on whether Cukor
had also signed his contract at the same time, but that is a common
practice. The studio will try to delay triggering its pay-or-play
obligations until the project is far along. Until the contract is formed, the
studio has no obligation to pay anything. MacLaine might turn down
roles that would conflict with this project because she anticipates that the
project will go forward, but until the pay-or-play clause is triggered, she
bears all the consequences. The parties bargain, in effect, over when,
and how, the actor's reliance (forbearance) will be, protected. 5 The
84. The studio should be free to make that decision without second-guessing by
the courts. In a recent case, however, the court held that the studio's discretion was
limited by an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Locke v. Warner
Bros., Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921 (Ct. App. 1997). The facts of that case are somewhat
unusual as the disputed contract was apparently part of a settlement following the
dissolution of the personal and romantic relationship of Clint Eastwood and Sondra Locke.
Immediately following the settlement, Warner (Eastwood's studio) signed a development
deal with Locke, which included a $750,000 pay-or-play arrangement to direct some
future unspecified project. Warner did not approve any of her projects, paid her the
$750,000 (plus another $750,000 for an exclusive first look), and argued that it had
satisfied its contractual duty. Locke argued that the studio, to please Eastwood, had no
intention of making any movie with her and that the deal was a sham. She sued for
breach of contract and for fraud; the California Court of Appeal, reversing the trial court,
denied Warner summary judgment. See id. at 921. In contrast to Parker's implication
that only the $750,000 guarantee was at stake, the court noted that:
Merely because Warner paid Locke the guaranteed compensation under the
agreement does not establish Warner fulfilled its contractual obligation. As
pointed out by Locke, the value in the subject development deal was not
merely the guaranteed payments under the agreement, but also the opportunity
to direct and produce films and earn additional sums, and most importantly,
the opportunity to promote and enhance a career.
Id. at 926.
85. The contract formula will typically serve as the baseline for renegotiation.
When, for example, Alan Arkin's contract was terminated two weeks before principal
photography was to begin on Bonfire of the Vanities, the studio's only legal obligation was
to pay his fixed compensation-$120,000. However, the co-producer suggested that the
studio would do more. "We expressed our apologies to Alan-and we'll have to negotiate
something. This is not the first time this sort of thing has happened-nor will it be the
last, but we are concerned about his feelings." SALAMON, supra note 76, at 110.
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subtlety of the triggering mechanism is well illustrated by the contract of
a supporting actor who would only be made pay-or-play upon receipt of
a bona fide conflicting offer. In effect, the producer's option would be
a variation on a right of first refusal.86 Upon signing the agreement, the
artist commits to being available. The producer can terminate the artist
without cost until the start of shooting or until it "matches" an outside
offer that includes a pay-or-play provision.
B. Past Performance
Not all pay-or-play clauses are meant to balance the talent's reliance
against the studio's flexibility. For some, their contribution to a project
is essentially completed by the time the pay-or-play clause is triggered.
The "packaging producer" (as opposed to the "line producer" who will
be involved during production) will typically have compensation in three
pieces. A producer would receive a fairly modest (currently in the
$25,000-$50,000 range) development fee. Since most projects fail to
come to fruition, that is all the producer would receive. If, however, the
project advances to a certain point, the producer will receive the fixed
component of the compensation, which might well be ten times (or more)
the development fee. Finally, if the producer continues with the project
until completion, the producer would be eligible for contingent
compensation, likely as a share of "net profits." 7 Since the packaging
producer is not expected to be involved in the production of the film, a
pay-or-play clause is a convenient device for limiting the required
compensation to the first two components. Once the packaging
producer's contribution is complete, the studio can simply invoke the pay-
or-play clause providing the producer with the fixed compensation and
86. In the event that Artist receives a conflicting bonafide 'pay-or-play'
offer on another motion picture which Artist would otherwise accept, Artist
shall accord Producer the right to pre-empt such other offer by furnishing
Artist with a 'pay-or-play' guarantee for his guaranteed compensation
hereunder within five (5) business days of receipt by Producer of a written
request therefor describing the conflicting 'pay-or-play' offer. If producer so
exercises said right of preemption, Artist shall render his services hereunder
on the Start Date, as defined herein. If Producer does not so furnish Artist
with such guarantee, Artist may elect to be released from his obligations
hereunder.
(Redacted contract excerpt on file with author.) The star of the same movie had a more
attractive pay-or-play clause, though unlike Shirley MacLaine's contract, it was not
triggered upon signing.
87. Goldberg, supra note 7, at 538-39.
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relieving itself of the legal burden to pay the contingent compensation."
The studio has purchased an option on the producer's time, but, unlike
the actor's contract, the presumption is that the studio will choose not to
exercise the option.
C. Offset
Judge Kingsley's characterization of the pay-or-play clause as
"assurance that a performer will not, without its consent, create
competition for other pictures of the employer" 9 is slightly off on two
counts. The primary motivating force is almost certainly not shielding the
studio from the actor creating competition, although industry people might
characterize it this way. It is not plausible that preventing the production
of a film with a particular star in a particular narrow window of time
(fourteen weeks for Shirley MacLaine) would have much of an impact on
the individual studio. 90
Nor does the actor require the studio's consent.91 The contract
grants the studio a limited right to prevent the actor from working with
another studio (and perhaps other potential employers) for a specified
period. That right is protected not by a "property rule" but only by a
"liability rule."' That is, the studio cannot prevent the actor from
working with someone else during the production period; it can only
collect damages by setting off payments from the third party against its
fixed compensation liability.
It was not always so. When most artists were under long-term
contracts in the 1930s and 1940s, the studio did have the right to prevent
them from working elsewhere. This did not mean that the artist wouldn't
work elsewhere; it simply meant that the third-party employer had to
88. The packaging producer's clause must be triggered by a particular
contractually defined event, preferably one that reflects the completion of that phase of
the process. One common choice is the date at which some principal (the star and/or the
director) is made pay-or-play.
89. See supra text accompanying note 73.
90. The studio with the largest box office share has averaged around 20% since
1975. See A.D. Murphy, Domestic Theatrical Film Distributor Market Shares 1970-1995,
THE 1996-97 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EXHIBITION (National Ass'n of Theatre Owners, N.
Hollywood, CA), at 194. The adverse effects of another studio having a big hit are
diffused over the remaining producers, so that the rewards to thwarting a project will be
spread over the remaining studios; the initial studio would receive only a small share of
the returns.
91. Judge Kingsley recognized this; Paramount, as he noted, had something akin
to a first refusal right in Carroll Baker's contract. See supra text accompanying note 73.
92. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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bargain with the studio to "rent" the employee. If the artist's market
value were greater than the contract price, the studio could pocket the
difference. Renting talent from other studios was a common
occurrence-an industry study found over 2000 loan-outs of actors,
directors, and cinematographers among the seven major studios between
1933-1939. 93
So, although the studio in the 1930s had the power to prevent an
actor from "creating competition," it usually chose not to wield that
power. Rather, it more typically attempted to allocate its "assets" (artists
under contract) to their highest and best use, since the studio would
benefit both from the direct payments on this film and, possibly, the
enhanced reputation of the artist. That might entail having the artist "sit
and wait,"' but the motive for refusing to loan out the artist would be
management of the inventory of talent (a better use for that artist might
come along), not preventing the creation of competition.
1. ONE PICTURE DEALS
In the modern era, the studio's right has been protected only by a
liability rule, in both one-shot deals (Shirley MacLaine) and in multi-
picture deals (Carroll Baker). I will discuss some aspects of the multi-
picture deal below, but for now will focus on the one-shot deal. If the
studio invokes the pay-or-play clause, the artist is free to contract with
someone else during that time slot. However, any earnings must be offset
against the original contract. Rather than requiring the artist or third-
party employer to negotiate with the original studio, the rule fixes a price
in advance. The rule appears to establish a 100% tax on the subsequent
transaction, which would seem to dampen incentives. Why shouldn't
Shirley MacLaine just go to the beach?
Even if the entire fixed compensation had to be set off, there are
good reasons why an artist might choose to perform rather than remain
idle. First, the fixed compensation is only one element in the
compensation package. Shirley MacLaine stood to make millions on her
gross participation. Even if the compensation terms of the second
contract were identical, the expected value of the contract would be
substantially greater than her Bloomer Girl fixed compensation. If
opportunities for roles of equivalent economic value are few and far
between, she might find the potential gains from the contingent
compensation attractive despite the fact that the fixed compensation from
the second movie would go to Fox, not to her. Second, if the period
93. See SCHATZ, supra note 76, at 323.
94. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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between signing the original contract and the production period is long
(over nine months in Shirley MacLaine's case), the artist's market value
can change dramatically. If an actor had one box office hit in the interim,
fixed compensation might well jump from $100,000 on the canceled
picture to $1 million on the new one. Third, even if the expected
compensation for the second picture just equaled the pay-or-play
obligation (so that the expected net compensation was zero), the actor still
might be willing to make the second picture because doing so might
enhance future earnings. 5 Fourth, since salaries are paid weekly, the
offset only applies to the overlapping period. So, for example, had
MacLaine started a movie with a different studio in the last week of the
pay-or-play period, only one week of her compensation ($53,571.43)
would be offset.
The preceding paragraph presupposes that the initial studio would be
willing and able to enforce the entire offset. That is unlikely. The first
studio is, in effect, bargaining with the second, and its bargaining position
is not terribly strong. Its only chip in the negotiations is the few weeks
of the career of a particular artist. The second studio has two dimensions
in which it can substitute. It could choose someone else to perform,
someone not burdened by the offset "tax." Or it could shift the timing
of the project to avoid the pay-or-play period. That flexibility should, in
most instances, enable the second studio to bargain away a considerable
portion of the offset. If the artist has the right to refuse any offer, no
matter how reasonable, the duty to offset is not likely to be onerous.
Still, even though the tax is likely to be much less than 100%, that
doesn't explain why there should be any tax at all. Why not simply let
the artist take any new offer that comes along unencumbered by the
previous arrangement with the studio? The most plausible reason is that
the tax (whatever its effective rate) provides some incentive for the studio
to terminate in a timely manner. The earlier the exercise of the pay-or-
play option, the more likely it is that the artist will find alternative
employment and provide some offset to the first studio's contractual
obligation.'
These arguments suggest that Judge Zack erred in stating that all
earnings during the pay-or-play period, even those as a seamstress, must
be offset against the studio's obligation. If the artist knew that such
earnings-a small fraction of the studio's obligation-would be offset,
95. On the value of a track record, see Goldberg, supra note 7, at 540, and the
materials cited therein. Recall that in Locke the court explicitly recognized that
production of the film could enhance career prospects. Locke, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 926.
96. 1 am indebted to Saul Levmore and Kenny Jones for raising this issue in
workshops. It is, essentially, the argument for encouraging anticipatory repudiation by
a party who has determined that it will not perform.
1998:1051 1079
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
then there is no reason for the actor to work (the tax is 100%) and no
reason for the parties to bargain over it. The only reasons the artist might
engage in such non-theatrical work would be ignorance (she didn't know
the rule) or an expectation that the studio wouldn't bother to enforce its
legal right. That expectation is likely to be correct since in most instances
it would not be worth the studio's effort to litigate the matter, although
if a case were litigated on other grounds the studio would likely raise this
point in its attempt to limit damages (as was the case in Constance
Bennett's radio contracts).' So, while application of the offset rule for
non-entertainment alternative employment would be silly,9' it is unlikely
to cause much harm since the parties would not, in most instances, take
it seriously.
2. MULTI-PICTURE DEALS
The modern multi-picture deal differs markedly from the long-term
contracts of yesteryear. In the pre-1950 long-term contracts, the artist's
ability to reject a proposed role was drastically curtailed. The studio
assigned the artist to a film and, if the artist refused, the studio could
suspend the artist.' If the artist wanted to make a picture with another
studio, she needed permission from the first studio. Now, the studio has
the obligation to offer projects, but the artist need not accept. Nor would
the studio have the exclusive right to the artist's services. If the artist
wanted to make a film with another studio, the first studio would have,
in essence, a first refusal right. Technically, a first refusal right allows
the holder to buy an asset (here, the artist's time) at a price fixed by the
third party. In this case, the relevant constraint is not the third party's
offer price, but merely the existence of an offer that the artist finds
acceptable. As Judge Kingsley noted in a footnote in his discussion of the
Carroll Baker contract, "[u]nder the contract, plaintiff could perform for
another producer, provided she gave Paramount notice of her intent; in
that event, Paramount was required either to consent or to schedule her
for its own picture at the time or times involved."101 If the studio fails
to offer a role for the time slot, the artist is free to make the film
97. See supra text accompanying note 60.
98. Constance Bennett's radio performances might be a closer case. These were,
in part, an investment in developing a presence in an alternative medium; indeed, in the
1940s she devoted more attention to radio than to film. See Rod Crawford, Internet
Movie Database (visited Sept. 21, 1998) <http://us.imdb.com/Bio?Bennett,
+ Constance>.
99. For a description of Betty Davis's battles with Warner Brothers in the 1930s,
see SCHATZ, supra note 76, at 139, 205-06, 217-21.
100. See supra text accompanying note 73.
1080
Bloomer Girl Revisited
elsewhere. If the artist were the originator of the project, she might have
to offer the contract studio a "first look." If the studio fails to pick up
the project within a contractually determined time period, the artist would
be free to shop it elsewhere.
Carroll Baker's contract made her pay-or-play for at least one film
each year. An alternative, and I think more common, arrangement,
would give the studio an option to use the artist in one film each year for
one fee (a guarantee), 01  If the studio desired to use the artist in a
particular film, it would offer the artist pay-or-play status for a second fee
(at a predetermined rate). 1°2 Regardless of the precise structure, there
remains the same two problems. First, if the studio cannot require the
artist to work on a particular film, what consequences might the artist
bear by refusing a project? Second, if, say, Fox offers a part to Carroll
Baker and Paramount fails to match, should Paramount's "guarantee
payment" (the $200,000) be offset by the earnings from the second
studio's project? Or, turning that around, should Fox have to repay some
or all of Paramount's guarantee payment as a cost of hiring Carroll
Baker?
The artist's discretion is a crucial variable in a multi-picture deal,
and the outcome will reflect the bargaining power (marketability) of the
artist. The more powerful artists will demand considerable freedom in
their choice of roles, while relative unknowns will have much less
discretion. The pay-or-play clause can be used to make the artist take the
studio's reliance interest seriously, a reversal of the single-picture
story.1°3 If the studio offers the artist a role and evidences its
seriousness by offering to make the artist pay-or-play, and the artist
refuses, the artist can be made to bear the costs in two dimensions. The
contract could require that the fixed compensation that would have been
triggered by the pay-or-play clause be offset against the guarantee. That
would mean that the studio has met its obligation of employing the artist
for one of the contracted pictures, but at a relatively modest cost.
Additionally, the pay-or-play offer could define a time period during
which the artist could not perform for another studio without the studio's
consent (or at least a right of offset). By varying (1) the ease with which
the studio can trigger the pay-or-play clause; and (2) the artist's ability to
accept offers from other studios (the length of time, the reasonableness of
101. See the Redacted "Term Loanout Agreement," on file with author. Artists
typically set up their own corporations which then loan out the artist to the movie studio.
102. If the artist accepted, then the pay-or-play clause would be triggered; if the
artist rejected, then there would still be consequences as described in the following
paragraph.
103. The arrangement described in this paragraph is essentially the one established
in the above referred to redacted contract. See supra note 101.
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consent, the magnitude of the offset), the parties can customize to some
degree the cost to the artist of rejecting the studio's proposed role.
With the multi-picture deal, the breadth of the studio's option is
much greater than the one-shot deal. In the one-shot deal, the artist has
committed to a tightly defined time period. The narrowness of that
window constrained the first studio's bargaining power; the second studio
could wait a few weeks (at a cost) and eliminate the problem. That is not
so for the multi-picture deal as a whole (although it is true for each
individual project offered to the artist). I would suspect that an artist with
considerable bargaining power when entering into a long-term contract
(i.e., one that was very marketable) would eliminate the offset. That
would allow pursuit of outside offers without penalty and would also
enhance the employer's incentive to find attractive roles. The less
successful (at the time of contract formation) are more likely to be stuck
with a duty to offset."°
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Whether the parties would require offset in a particular contract, one-
shot or multi-picture, is a hard question. It should not, however, be
confused with the much easier question raised by Parker: must the artist
take a reasonable offer to "mitigate" damages? No. Shirley MacLaine
granted the studio an option to utilize her services for a specific use and
104. In a related context, the offset issue was at the core of a dispute between John
Calipari and the New Jersey Nets. Calipari entered into a five-year contract to coach the
Nets. He had been coaching for a few months before the deal had been memorialized in
a writing (heaven knows why). At that stage Calipari insisted that there be no offset if
he were fired and subsequently hired as a basketball coach during the duration of the
contract. Calipari ultimately prevailed. Contemporaneous press accounts suggested that
the majority of National Basketball Association coaches (seventeen) were required to offset
their earnings from the second coaching job against the unpaid balance of the first
contract. More powerful coaches (Pat Riley and Larry Brown were named) did not have
offset clauses. See Will McDonough, Calipari Agrees to Stay with Nets, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 21, 1996, at D5; Selena Roberts, Calipari Resisting a Contract Addition, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1996, at B15.
The offset issue arises in guaranteed player contracts as well. Arbitrations in both
the National Basketball Association and National Football League held that where the
contract was silent, guaranteed player contracts did not require the player to offset when
signing with another team. See NFL Players' Ass'n v. NFL Management Council, 233
Cal. Rptr. 147 (Ct. App. 1986) (Arbitration of Dante Pastorini & Oakland Raiders);
Arbitration of Rudy Hackett & Denver Nuggets (1977). The NBA collective bargaining
agreement was subsequently revised to provide for offset against guaranteed compensation.
These arbitrations and the NBA collective bargaining agreement are discussed in PAUL C.
WEILER & GARY ROBARTS, CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS ON SPORTS AND THE LAW
299 (1993).
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a specific purpose. For good and sensible reasons, the studio was
prepared to pay a considerable sum for that option. It then chose not to
exercise the option. The studio's breach was not the failure to make the
film, but only the failure to pay the contracted-for option price. Had the
courts framed the question properly, they would have reached the right
result for the right reasons.
Instead, the court took a "different and inferior" path (in both
senses). The court asked whether the alternate employment was different
and inferior as a matter of law and somehow concluded that it was. It is
hard to imagine how a rational court could find the second contract
"different and inferior" as a matter of law while at the same time citing
with approval de la Falaise. After all, that court found radio plays
(regardless of content) different but not inferior. If a radio play is not
inferior to a movie, how could a court find one unmade movie necessarily
inferior to another? 1°5
The fact that there were significant differences between Bloomer
Girl and Big Country, Big Man, I suspect, encouraged the courts to go
down the wrong track. Suppose that the second offer was virtually
identical-a Hollywood musical with the same director, same approvals,
same compensation, same timing, and same politics. Had MacLaine
refused to make the second picture as "mitigation," then she could not
have raised the "different and inferior" objection. Without the "different
and inferior" crutch, the parties would have posed the problem properly,
and the court, like Judge Kingsley in Garfein, would have disposed of it
neatly.
Maybe. A less sanguine view would be that the Parker analysis is
symptomatic of deeper problems. Why did the California Supreme Court
ignore the purpose of the relevant contract language in determining
whether Shirley MacLaine had to mitigate? Does the disjunction between
contract law's analytic boxes and transactional lawyers' practical concerns
lead to systematic error in contract litigation? In particular, is there a
hostility against option arrangements, which could be viewed as a form
of "penalty clause?" (The studio agrees, in effect, to pay a penalty if it
fails to perform.) Indeed, when I presented an earlier draft of this paper
at workshops, the immediate response was to ask if contracting parties
105. de la Falaise could be justified if the court had recognized a distinction
between cases in which the plaintiff had been employed (offset) and those in which (like
Parker) it had not. The court could plausibly argue that a radio play, unlike a seamstress
job, is close enough (not inferior) to warrant an offset of the earnings, if earnings there
be, while still holding that the law did not require that the plaintiff accept a radio script
in mitigation.
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could use the option characterization to evade the penalty clause bar."
To which the appropriate response should be: hear, hear. There is no
reason for wooden application of the rule barring penalty clauses. Shirley
MacLaine is no Shylock. The studios are not being put upon by her or
other artists; they include pay-or-play clauses in their contracts (and these
are, after all, the studios' contracts) for good reason. The pay-or-play
clause is a nuanced balancing of the studio's need for flexibility against
the artist's reliance.
Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of Parker is that the court's
framing of the issue has seemed so appropriate and non-controversial to
legal scholars and courts for over a quarter of a century. The court might
have drawn the "different and inferior" boundary in the wrong place, but
there has been no questioning the notion that ascertaining this boundary
is the relevant inquiry. Even the one attempt to reframe Parker, Mary Jo
Frug's feminist discussion, stays within the "different and inferior"
framework. Contracts casebooks, in general, and Dawson, Harvey, and
Henderson, in particular, she claimed:
[i]nexplicably ...omit material that would confirm readers'
intuitions that the social context and political significance of the
films might explain the application of the "different or inferior"
qualification in Parker. Dawson, Harvey, and Henderson thus
subtly deter readers who are familiar with nineteenth century
feminist activists and their work from utilizing their personal
connections with the case to understand Parker .... Although
readers' intuitions about the Parker case may in fact explain the
otherwise baffling result of this decision, the casebook does not
encourage them to draw on those intuitions."
It makes no sense to interpret a standardized clause on the basis of the
hypothesized idiosyncratic politics of a particular artist. The court,
unfortunately, invited argument along these (and other irrelevant) lines,
and academics, alas, have accepted.
106. Part of the problem, I suspect, is the notion held by many contracts professors
that $750,000 (in 1965 dollars) is too much to pay Shirley MacLaine for "doing nothing."
One wonders how they will cope with Sondra Locke's claim that $1,500,000 for "doing
nothing" is too little. Of course, as Judge Kingsley pointed out in Garfein, they are not
doing nothing-"[t]hey also serve who only sit and wait." Garfein, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
107. Frug, supra note 5, at 1119 (footnote omitted). The socio-political context
receives at least lip service in a few casebooks. See FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, supra note
1, at 513; KASTELY ET AL., supra note 1, at 1024; KNAPP & CRYSTAL, supra note 1, at
949-51; MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 63-65.
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